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Introduction
One of the most important functions of the discipline of 
economics is to provide a rational basis for policy making. 
The role of evidence is at its heart, yet the scientific approach 
to social matters may also blind us to fundamental normative 
issues that must be faced before we can answer the question: 
does this policy make us better off? 
assumptions and trade-offs, ex post 
questioning of the economic models, and 
meta-analysis. As a result there was little 
broader critical analysis that might have 
suggested improvements to this policy. 
Evidence-based policy
The 1999 UK white paper Modernising 
Government proposed that being evidence-
based was one of several core features 
of effective policy making, a theme 
developed in subsequent government 
publications (Bullock, Mountford and 
Stanley, 2001; Strategic Policy Making 
Team, 1999). As in the UK, evidence-
based approaches to social policy became 
popular in New Zealand. The theme 
of the 2003 Social Policy Research and 
Evaluation conference convened by 
the Ministry of Social Development 
was the incorporation of research and 
evaluation into evidence-based policy and 
service delivery. Subsequent conferences 
strengthened the belief that objectivity 
and hence better policies would result 
from taking an evidence-based approach.
The concept of evidence-based policy 
has an intituitive common sense 
logic, which partly explains how it 
has become naturalised in a diverse 
range of policy settings. (Marston and 
Watts, 2003, 144)
This article first outlines the background 
to ‘evidence-based’ or ‘evidence-informed’ 
policy, sometimes called ‘what works’, and 
then suggests a simple framework for 
policy analysis that highlights the points at 
which research-based evidence may, could, 
or should have an impact. The framework 
may also be adapted to provide a basis for 
a critique of existing social policy.
Major policies like Working for 
Families (WFF) are implemented with 
large budgets for evaluation; however, 
in practice such evaluations may take a 
narrow focus. This article uses the policy 
framework to critique WFF with an 
emphasis on the component designed to 
incentivise work called the in-work tax 
credit (IWTC). The conclusion of our 
analysis is that quantitative measurement 
of employment outcomes of the work 
incentive part of WFF became an 
end point of the policy process and 
appeared to provide an ‘evidence-based’ 
endorsement. The official evaluations 
largely ignored qualitative factors, 
unintended consequences, normative 
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As Nutley, Davies and Walter (2003, 
29) argue, it became fashionable to 
emphasise the role of evidence and 
analysis, thus making social science and 
policy making appear ‘objective’ and 
‘scientific’. However, statistical methods 
designed for an idealised world may 
rely on some assumptions that make 
the results questionable. Also, unless the 
samples are large, and a wide range of 
factors are included, statistically teasing 
apart aspects that usually occur together 
is difficult. The process may obscure 
other evidence essential to developing the 
deeper understanding that policy makers 
(and others) need (see Wylie, 2006, 8-9). 
In this environment there are many 
caveats around most evidence-based 
evaluations of social policy. Adopting 
‘what works?’ as a slogan can be simplistic 
and dangerous. Intervening in children’s 
lives, especially, as discussed in Roberts 
(2005), is ‘not just a research, policy and 
practice issue ... it is also a rights issue for 
children and young people’ (p.34). When 
assessing a social policy such as WFF, 
where the work behaviour of parents was 
intended to be modified by a payment to 
achieve poverty objectives for children, 
the role of quantitative evidence may be 
limited. 
The WFF policy has been subject 
to a number of official and unofficial 
appraisals and evaluations, as set out 
in the appendix below. The first official 
evaluation was delivered at a Victoria 
University tax conference in Wellington 
in February 2009, and published online 
(Ministry of Social Development and 
Inland Revenue, 2009). A further iteration 
(Dalgety et al., 2010a) and a technical 
report (Dalgety et al., 2010b) were further 
updated in the final evaluation report, 
Changing Families’ Financial Support 
and Incentives for Working: the summary 
report of the Working for Families 
package (Centre for Social Research and 
Evaluation, 2010c), with several annexes 
looking specifically at technical issues, 
such as effective marginal tax rates.
Various researchers have been 
interested in evaluating whether WFF 
increases or decreases other kinds of 
social behaviour apart from working, 
such as partnering or having children 
(for example, see Fitzgerald, Maloney and 
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Box 1: Policy development framework 
Source: revised from St John and Dale, 2010
1. Clarify the problem. 
2. Set clear objectives (aims) for policy; note trade-offs.
3. Make aims measurable or quantifiable. 
4. Select policy criteria: e.g. cost-effectiveness, economic efficiency, equity, 
administrative simplicity; outline theories or models that inform policy 
development.
5. Assess a full range of policies that might achieve the objectives.
6. Select and design the best policy; project expected costs and outcomes. 
7. Implement policy.
8. Measure outcomes against clearly stated, measurable objectives. 
9. Review unintended consequences. 
10. Evaluate policy against criteria; confirm that the problems and the 
underlying economic model have been properly conceived; and suggest 
improvements.
Table 1: WFF changes, alignment with objectives and the change in annual expenditure
WFF changes
Objectives of WFF changes Change 
in annual 
expenditure 
(2004–
2008)1
Make work 
pay
Ensure 
income 
adequacy
Delivery 
supports 
people into 
work
Increases in family tax credit 
rates (1 April 2005 and 1 April 
2007)

+$1,087m2
Changes to the abatement 
regime of WFF tax credits from 
1 April 2006
 
Introduction of the in-work tax 
credit (1 April 2006)   +$485m3
Annual adjustment of the 
minimum family tax credit4    +$5m
An increase in the 
accommodation supplement 
thresholds and rates
  +$177m
Increased child care assistance 
for those eligible   +$93m
Removal of the child component 
of main benefits 5   -$297m
Replacement of the special 
benefit with temporary 
additional support6
 -$3m
Total change in expenditure +$1,548m
Systems to support delivery of 
WFF changes  +$108m
Source: adapted from Centre for Social Research and Evaluation, 2010c, p.2
1. Tax years ended March.
2. Expenditure on family tax credit and parental tax credit.
3. Expenditure on in-work tax credit and child tax credit.
4. Ensures no reduction in income when moving off benefit into paid work.
5. Estimated, assuming every sole parent receiving domestic purposes benefit with one child would have received $27 child 
component a week, and those with two or more children would have received $54 child component.
6. Temporary additional support is targeted at beneficiaries with higher financial costs.
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Pacheco, 2008). These issues, however, are 
not further explored here. 
The policy framework
An economics framework for policy 
analysis can be set out in a number of 
ways. In the suggested sequence shown in 
Box 1, evidence has a role at each step, but 
is itself capable of manipulation. There are 
also normative disagreements that should 
be made explicit but which may instead be 
subsumed in the political process. 
The objectives and normative values of 
politicians may influence each step of the 
policy process, and the choice of criteria 
and their weighting may be different 
from those of the policy analysts. Thus, 
each step has the potential for confusion 
and loss of clarity, with a large element 
of subjectivity in the selection of the 
kinds of evidence to be used. As always, 
the ‘question’ determines the possible 
‘answer’. For there to be a quantitative 
evaluation, the aims of policy must be 
measurable. The process of measuring 
may lose sight of the underlying social 
policy outcomes judged on broader 
considerations, including whether the 
problems have actually been addressed, 
whether the underlying economic model 
was properly conceived, or how policy 
may be improved (for a discussion of 
measuring the success of social policy see 
St John, 1997).
How should a good result be 
measured? Does it ‘work’ if it meets 
the objectives of the policy? Or should 
it be assessed according to a set of 
higher order principles capable of 
transcending political ideologies and 
good intention? (Durie, 2004, 2)
Case study: Working for Families, the role of 
the in-work tax credit
The above framework is useful for the 
development of new policy, and can also 
be adapted to analyse existing policy. 
The WFF financial assistance package, 
implemented between October 2004 and 
April 2007, and summarised in Table 1, 
was a major policy change for the support 
of New Zealand’s children (St John, 2006, 
2011). This case study examines the role of 
the tax credits, described in more detail 
in Table 2, with a particular focus on the 
IWTC which was introduced on 1 April 
2006, and, as can be seen from Table 1, 
had a dual focus on income adequacy and 
making work pay. 
Table 2 shows that all low-income 
families with children are entitled to 
a per-week, per-child family tax credit 
(FTC). If they are not in receipt of a 
benefit, and meet the work test, they may 
also be entitled to the IWTC. This is a 
child-related payment of $60 for one-
three children, rising by $15 per child 
for the fourth and subsequent children. 
These two main tax credits recognise the 
extra costs of children and are usually 
paid fortnightly to the caregiver, with 
the amount dependent on the combined 
annual family income and the number 
and age of dependent children. The total 
amount is abated from a household 
income of $36,860 at a rate of 20%, with 
the IWTC abated last. 
In 2011 the IWTC and the FTC cost 
a total of $2.8 billion, with 21% for the 
IWTC. For low working income families, 
the value of the IWTC is significant: 
for example, for a one-child family it is 
around 40% of total family assistance.2
The minimum family tax credit 
(MFTC), designed to encourage an exit 
from the benefit system, is a flat-rate 
top-up that guarantees a minimum level 
of income for working families.3 For 
example, a sole parent on the domestic 
purposes benefit (DPB) working 20 hours 
could be shifted off the benefit and have 
net wages topped up with the MFTC. 
Families with children may receive the 
FTC and the IWTC in addition to the 
MFTC. The MFTC replaces, in effect, 
their part-benefit and ensures that they 
are not worse off. However, it abates 
at 100% for every extra dollar earned, 
providing a maximum work disincentive.
What was the problem to be addressed?
By the early 2000s family income assistance 
had fallen markedly in real terms through 
neglect and a lack of inflation indexing. 
The key WFF policy document from the 
Cabinet policy committee (2004) noted 
that ‘the declining real value of family 
income assistance has been a key factor 
contributing to inadequate family income’ 
(p.1). 
The political context for the 
development of WFF was that the 
government had vowed to eliminate child 
poverty (Ministry of Social Development, 
2002). There was nothing to suggest in 
the conceptualisation of the problem that 
the concern was not about all children in 
poverty. Child poverty was described as 
having ‘negative effects on the well-being 
Table 2: Tax credits in Working for Families 
Tax credit
Cost ($m) year 
ended June 
2011
Nature of payment (2011)
Family tax credit 
(FTC)
$2,200
Child-related weekly supplement: $88 per week 
for the first child, $61 for subsequent children, 
higher rates for children over 13.
Abated at 20% from $36,860 joint income.
In-work tax credit 
(IWTC)
$592
Child-related weekly supplement, work 
requirement: 20 hours sole parent, 30 hours 
couple; and off-benefit. $60 per week for 1ñ3-
child families, increasing to $75 per week for a 
4-child family, $90 for a 5-child family, and for a 
6-child family $105 a week. 
Abated after the FTC.
Minimum family Ttx 
credit (MFTC)
minor
Minimum family income top-up (net $22,204). 
Requires same hours of work as the IWTC and 
off-benefit.
The MFTC is abated at 100% for additional 
income.
Parental tax credit* 
(PTC)
minor
Paid $150 a week for 8 weeks for new child.
Abated after the IWTC.
Source: IRD, https://interact1.ird.govt.nz/forms/famcalc2008/ 
*  The PTC is paid for a small number of families with a new baby and while providing design issues of its own (St John and 
Familton, 2011) is not further discussed here.
